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Utdraget nedan är intressant. Som vanligt ligger svensk media efter i rapporteringen från Afghanistan där ju Sverige deltar i kriget mot Talibanerna. Att NATO och Pakistan nu börjar med gemensama operationer mot Talibaner och tyder knappast på att NATO håller på att vinna Afghanistan kriget. Eller att engagemanget enbart handlar om återuppbyggande som det fortfarande heter från officiellt svenskt håll. 

The trigger for this appears to have been planned joint Pakistan-NATO operations in the region against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The militants aim to open up several fronts in Pakistan to dissuade the military from cooperating with NATO.
This situation is an embarrassment to the security apparatus as it was believed that following recent countrywide operations that uncovered militant cells in Karachi, Rawalpindi, Mianwali, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan that the problem was being contained.

The regional war
Asia Times Online investigations show that the Taliban’s three-pronged plan for their spring offensive comprises cutting off NATO’s supply lines running from Pakistan to Afghanistan, recruiting fresh volunteers and, most importantly, the creation of a strategic corridor running from Pakistan all the way to the capital Kabul.
Since being ousted in 2001 and waging annual spring offensives, this is the first time the Taliban have come up with the idea of creating such a corridor.

The long road to Kabul
As things stand, the Taliban have established pockets of resistance all around Kabul, in addition to more settled pockets across the country. The Taliban roam around freely in the eastern province of Wardak, just 30 kilometers from Kabul.
But now the Taliban want to connect the dots, as it were, to ensure a quick and steady supply of arms and men to reinforce the pockets sufficiently for attacks on the capital.
It is envisaged that the corridor initially starts in Mohmand Agency and Bajaur Agency in Pakistan and then passes through Kunar and Nooristan provinces all the way to the Taghab Valley in Kapisa province in the northeast about 100 kilometers from the capital.
In 2006, the Taliban seized the strategic Taghab Valley – as well as the Musayab Valley to the south of Kabul – with the goal of an assault on the capital, but because of limited supply lines they were only able to maintain their positions for a few months.
This year, the Taliban aim to retake these positions, while having in place secure supply lines starting in the Pakistani tribal areas to maintain a steady stream of men and resources.
Over the past year, the Taliban have increased the number of their fighters in Mohmand Agency to 18,000 and to between 20,000 to 25,000 in Bajaur Agency. Taliban quarters believe this will provide sufficient strength to ensure operation, which is due to run from April to September.
The counter-strategy
This steady gathering of forces in the two agencies did not go unnoticed by NATO. So, with Pakistani assistance, NATO will increase military operations aimed at nipping the corridor idea in the bud.
American special ground troops have escalated their activities in Kunar and Nooristan provinces and a US base in Kunar, just three kilometers from Bajaur Agency, is now fully operational. Once the operations are in full swing, Pakistan will provide assistance through its air base in Peshawar for attacks on militant bases in the agencies.
"The operation has to start in the month of March as the Taliban have to launch their operation in April," a Pakistani security official told Asia Times Online.

Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan

Följande artikel om holländarnas erfarenheter från föra året i Afghanistan kan också vara av intresse.

Although Taliban fighters had routed villagers from their homes, they had made no major effort to attack coalition forces. Rietdijk’s troops halted most of their reconstruction work and concentrated on providing food, blankets and other humanitarian aid to the hundreds of refugees who had descended on impoverished friends and relatives south of the Tarin River.

"The Americans told us there were no Taliban on the east bank," Hogeveen said. "Everyone told us it was safe — no Taliban."

But the Taliban had good reason to want to reclaim Deh Rawood. As the district surrounding Omar’s home town of the same name, it held symbolic importance to the Islamic militia. It held strategic importance, too: The district sits at the confluence of the Helmand and Tarin rivers on the most important drug- and arms-trafficking route in rugged Uruzgan province, connecting it to Iran to the west and Pakistan to the south.

As Hogeveen was settling into his armor-plated metal bunker at the main Dutch base, Camp Holland, near the provincial capital of Tarin Kot, Taliban fighters were evicting local police from three of Deh Rawood’s most strategic checkpoints. They bribed officers to abandon one post, kidnapped the son of a policeman at a second checkpoint and attacked the third, sending officers fleeing. They turned a local school into their headquarters and stocked it with weapons and ammunition, Hogeveen said he learned later.

Then they lay in wait and ambushed the first unsuspecting Dutch convoy they spotted.

"They were better prepared than anyone led us to believe," Hogeveen said.

Hogeveen’s troops and the Taliban skirmished almost daily.

NATO Confronts Surprisingly Fierce Taliban – washingtonpost.com