Claeskrantz.se

Med tanke på att det officiella motivet för Israels angrepp mot Gaza var självförsvar mot Hamas missiler är det intressant att läsa hur man från officiellt Israeliskt håll struntade i att införa ett anti-missil system som hade skyddat mot just Qassam raketer från Gaza!

Att Israel sade nej till att testa införandet av det amerikanskt anti-missil system till en kostnad av en miljon dollar för att istället satsa en miljard NIS till att utveckla ett eget inom den israeliska statliga försvarsindustrin är väl ytterligare en del av den politisk militära rutenheten och korruptionen inom Israel. Det militärindustriella komplexet i israel är en av de starkaste inhemska maktfaktorerna.

Inkompetensen hos de politiska ledarna i Israel har sedan dragit in landet i ett krig man inte kan vinna där de olika politiska ledarna kämpar om vem som kan dra mest fördel vid valurnorna om en månad av den massaker som nu sker på palestinier i gaza.

The message yesterday from Jerusalem was that it is
impossible to end Operation Cast Lead without an achievement, and if in the next two days there is no satisfactory diplomatic solution, Israel will have to broaden the operation.

?Broadening the operation? could mean moving from house to house as in Operating Defensive Shield in 2002 in the West Bank, aiming to kill or capture as many Hamas fighters as possible. Or it could mean surrounding Gaza City, similar to the way the Egyptian Third Army was cut off in 1973, or like the siege of Beirut in 1982, until Hamas? leaders emerge from their hideouts with their hands up. This could take several weeks.

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Political sources are denying reports of a disagreement at the top over the future of the operation, and insist that Ehud Olmert, Ehud Barak and Tzipi Livni are united in their understanding that under the current circumstances Israel should continue until there are diplomatic gains. Other sources say there are problems. Barak believes that rejecting the French offer for a cease-fire last week was a mistake that made Israel miss a good opportunity to end the operation; now he wants to go on. Olmert, according to some reports, is pushing for a broadening of the
offensive. Livni is worried that any international developments may grant Hamas legitimacy.

Israel is in a bind. If it pulls out now from Gaza, it will appear
to have cut and run at the first sign of trouble in battling Hamas. And if it goes on to a full occupation of the Strip, it may pay a heavy economic and political price without achieving its political goals.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1053122.html

Israel är nu på väg efter att ha backat in sig i ett hörn att återockupera Gaza till priset av tusentals palestinska liv och troligtvis 100000-tals flyktingar. Allt annat än ett fullständigt krossande av Hamas är en seger för organisationen vilket Israel förlorar ansiktet på. Alltså måste Israel fortsätta in i Gaza är den logik som gäller. IDF är förstås också ivriga att visa att man lärt sig från förlusten i Libanon 2006. Något jag undrar över.

Återigen, om folk nu inte fattat det. Talet om självförsvar och bekämpa terrorister är en lögn från Israels sida för att rättfärdiga ett angrepp som förberets lika länge som den vapenvila man valde att bryta från båda sidor.

Mer i media:
SVD, SVD2, DN, AB, HD, Newsmill1, Newsmill2, Newsmill3, Newsmill4, Newsmill5

Vad israel tackade nej till för Sderot som försvarssystem:

Ballistic expert: Israel ignoring option of U.S. anti-rocket system – Haaretz – Israel News

Ballistic expert: Israel ignoring option of U.S. anti-rocket system
By Yossi Melman, Haaretz Correspondent
Tags: Iron Dome, Israel, Qassam

Dr. Nathan Farber is a ballistic expert who has been persistently trying, to no avail, to present to the Defense Ministry what he sees as a possibly imminent solution to Qassam fire from Gaza.

Farber’s suggestion is to deploy American artillery batteries called Phalanx around the Qassam-battered town of Sderot, to intercept the rockets fired by Palestinians.

The U.S. army has been successfully operating the system in Iraq, where it provides its bases with protection from rockets and mortar shells. Canada is also considering deploying it in Afghanistan.

Farber told Haaretz his suggestion should not be rejected out of hand. He said that the system could be tested with a budget of no more than $1 million, even in the ”battlefield” itself, by deploying one or two Phalanx batteries near Sderot.

But for some reason the Defense Ministry maintains his suggestion is impracticable, although it has never been tested.

Farber is not an eccentric – his credentials include vast knowledge of and experience in shells and ballistics. He is an accredited aeronautical engineer, a lecturer at the Technion, Israel’s Institute of Technology, and a veteran of the Israel Military Industries (IMI).

When his tenure as the IMI missile department’s chief scientist ended, he worked as an advisor to the Israel Air Force and the American Missile Defense Administration. Previously, he had been an IAF anti-aircraft officer and later senior intelligence officer.

The Phalanx anti-aircraft artillery system, manufactured by the American Reytheon company, was initially developed for battleships.

A Phalanx battery includes four 20mm-wide shells and radar that tracks the missile, assesses its trajectory and intercepts it from a range of up to a 1.5 km.

Unlike any other system, Phalanx is capable of firing up to 6,000 shells per minute, which are twice as fast as a Qassam rocket (with a speed of more than a kilometer per second). As of today, the system is installed in some IDF battleships.

Farber claims that five batteries will adequately cover the western Negev, and will not cause environmental damage. ”Because of their exceptionally high speed, the shells that don’t hit Qassams will land in the sea,” he said, ”although the chances of a direct hit are high.”

For years the security establishment has stymied any initiative to develop short- and medium-range missile interception systems, claiming they were wasteful and of questionable efficiency.

Even after the Second Lebanon War, during which the missile threat on Israel’s home front materialized, the Defense Ministry remained resolute. An expert panel, headed by then Defense Ministry director general Gaby Ashkenazi (the incumbent Chief of Staff), was eventually set up, following pressure exerted by then defense minister Amir Peretz.

The panel decided to commission Rafael Arms Development Authority to develop two interception systems: Iron Dome, for short-range rockets (like Qassams and Katyushas) and Magic Wand for long-range missiles (up to 200 km), to be developed in conjunction with Reytheon.

A shadow of malpractice was cast on the decision to allocate a development budget of over NIS 1 billion to Rafael, as one of the panel members, Yedidya Yaari, was the former managing director of the authority.

The problem remains that Iron Dome will be operative within three years at the earliest.

”Why not deploy Phalanx batteries in the meanwhile, and protect the residents of Sderot?” asks Farber.

”It will be cheaper, no less efficient, and above all provide immediate protection. If it’s good enough for the Americans in Iraq, why can’t it be good for us?”

The Defense Ministry provided no definite answer as to why Farber’s suggestion hasn’t been considered.

A spokesman said that ”while the development of Iron Dome is underway, the security establishment continues to consider other options, including the American LUWD system. So far, we haven’t found a system that meets our demands, but we continue to look into newly developed as well as existing systems.”

Former deputy defense minister Ephraim Sneh said that the Ashkenazi Commission considered every available option and made its decision on a ”purely professional basis. The allegations that financial motives were at issue are malicious.”

Phalanx Versus The Palestinians

Phalanx Versus The Palestinians
by James Dunnigan
June 1, 2008
Discussion Board on this DLS topic

Although Israel is desperate for a weapon that will defend key targets from Palestinian rockets fired from Gaza, last year they turned down the one system known to work. That’s because the system is foreign. It’s a modified version of the U.S. Phalanx ship defense system. The Israeli government is still under tremendous pressure to do something, and they don’t want to invade and take over Gaza.

There are already two Israeli anti-rocket systems in the works, but it will be several years before these are available for service. Meanwhile, Hamas has greatly increased the number of rockets and mortar shells fired into southern Israel. It’s up to several hundred a month.

Two years ago, some Israelis noted that the American and British were already using an effective anti-rocket system; C RAM. This is a modified version of the U.S. Navy Phalanx system, which was originally designed to protect warships from anti-ship missiles. As originally designed, you turned Phalanx on whenever the ship was likely to have an anti-ship missile fired at it. The Phalanx radar can spot incoming missiles out to about 5,000 meters, and the 20mm cannon is effective out to about 2,000 meters. With incoming missiles moving a up to several hundred meters a second, you can see why Phalanx is set to automatic. There’s not much time for human intervention, which is why the Phalanx has to be turned on and set to automatically detect and shoot at incoming missiles. But weapons engineers discovered that Phalanx could take out incoming 155mm artillery shells as well. This capability is what led to C-RAM. Now Israel is bringing one of these system to Israel, to see how well it performs in actually defending against Palestinian Kassasm rockets.

Since 2003, there have been two major Phalanx mods. In one, the Phalanx was adapted to use on land, to shoot down incoming rockets. This was done by using a larger artillery spotting radar, which directs Phalanx to fire at incoming mortar shells and rockets. Not all the incoming stuff is hit, but nearly 80 percent of it is, and every little bit helps. The second mod is for shipboard use, and changes the software so the Phalanx can be used against small boats, especially those of the suicide bomber variety.

Two years ago, Israel examined C RAM for possible use in defending northern Israel against another Hizbollah rocket attack. That’s where Israelis apparently became aware of how C RAM could be used against Palestinian attacks using more primitive rockets. For defending northern Israel, C-RAM lacked the range to cover a long border against a variety of rocket types. But the home made Palestinian rockets fired from Gaza were another matter. Then, about a year ago, Britain bought a C RAM system to protect its air base in southern Iraq. A C-RAM Phalanx system, which can cover about four kilometers of border, costs $8 million.

C-RAM uses high explosive 20mm shells, that detonate near the target, spraying it with fragments. By the time these fragments reach the ground, they are generally too small to injure anyone. At least that’s been the experience in Iraq. The original Phalanx used 20mm depleted uranium shells, to slice through incoming missiles. Phalanx fires shells at the rate of 75 per second. Another advantage of C-RAM, is that it makes a distinctive noise when firing, warning people nearby that a mortar or rocket attack is underway, giving people an opportunity to duck inside if they are out and about.

The first C-RAM was sent to Iraq in late 2006, to protect the Green Zone (the large area in Baghdad turned into an American base). It was found that C-RAM could knock down 70-80 percent of the rockets and mortar shells fired within range of its cannon. Not bad, since it only took about a year to develop C-RAM. Meanwhile, another version, using a high-powered laser, instead of the 20mm gun, is in development.

Israel has several small targets it wants to defend in southern Israel. The most frequent target is the town of Sderot. Since 2001, over 2,000 Kassam (homemade) Palestinian rockets have been fired at Sderot. Ten people have been killed, and over fifty injured. The Israeli army has developed a radar system that provides 10-15 seconds warning, which is enough time to duck into a shelter. But Sderot only has 80 bomb shelters, most of them built 20-30 years ago and in need of repair. If you want to reduce the casualties in Sderot (about one dead or wounded per 30-40 rockets fired), you need to reduce the number of rockets landing. One C RAM system can defend an area about four kilometers in diameter. This makes it possible to defend Sderot with one or two Phalanx guns, and one early warning radar. There’s also a power plant and air force base in the south that could eventually be within range of larger Kassam rockets. One or two C RAM Phalanx guns at each would greatly reduce the risk of a Kassam doing any damage.

There are nearly 900 Phalanx systems in use, including some on Israeli warships. Most have not gotten these software mods, that enable the cannot to knock down rockets and shells, as well as incoming anti-ship missiles.